






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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

"HÖFFDING'S THEORY OF RELIGIOUS  
VALUE AND ITS RELATION TO EDUCATION."

Submitted by

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(A.B., Wellesley, 1920)

In partial fulfilment of requirements for  
the degree of Master of Arts

1922





Höffding's Theory of Religious  
Value and its Relation to Education.

Analysis of the  
Thesis.

1. The Introduction: the purpose of this paper shall be:
  - A. To expound and criticize Höffding's theory of the conservation of religious values;
  - B. To make clear the necessity of emphasizing the increase of these values;
  - C. To show the relation of these propositions to religious education.
2. The first point is a discussion of Höffding's theory of the conservation of religious values:
  - A. The following is Höffding's statement of his axiom with the amplification of his theory:
    - 1) The general statement is: "The conservation of value is the characteristic axiom of religion."
    - 2) In the amplification of the theory the following points will be covered:
      - a) Relation of the axiom to physical science: analogous to the conservation of energy;
      - b) Relation to experience:

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- 1) Experience discovers values;
  - 2) Shows us that the fate of the values is at stake.
- c) Psychological discussion of the axiom: the relation between reality and value is psychologically the religious consciousness.
- d) Historical discussion of the axiom: two types, both dealing with value:
- 1) The highest values are always present;
  - 2) The highest values are gained only through struggle.
- e) Epistemological treatment of the axiom: value lies in the symbolic conception of religious ideas.
- f) Metaphysical treatment of the subject:
- 1) Eliminates controversy between philosophy and science;





### III

2) Tends toward a philosophical unity in the world of experience.

g) Ethical interpretation of the axiom: the realization of values occurs in ethics.

B. The criticism and the examination of the criticisms made upon Höffding's theory:

1) The criticism that value is not the essential element in the religious consciousness:

a) Höffding's whole theory is based upon this;

b) Examination proves it to be essential to religion.

2) The criticism of Höffding's ideas of Personality of God and conception of Immortality:

a) We are necessarily driven to the belief in a Personal God, since Reality-Value would have no meaning other-





wise;

- b) Immortality of personalities must be assured if values are to be eternally conserved.

3) Sorley's criticisms:

- a) Claims that Höffding's view is too narrow, but study of Höffding shows that Höffding saw the larger significance referred to;

- b) The mere conservation of value is not a satisfactory axiom:

- 1) Höffding himself notes the importance of the increase of value, and then ignores it;

- 2) Increase in value is the foundation of progress.

- c) Criticism of the distinction between mystical and practical religion:

- 1) Not fair to mysticism;
- 2) Valuable in that it makes





plain the necessity  
for expression of  
value.

3. The positive implications of the idea of axiom of the conservation and the increase of religious values and their relation to religious education:
  - A. The belief that at the heart of religion is value, which it is man's religious duty to conserve.
  - B. Religious education has a definite part to play in the increase of the values.
  - C. Values are conserved not statically but in essence; this is particularly true of religious values.
  - D. Values may be realized merely through <sup>s</sup>personalities. This brings up the following considerations in the matter of education:
    - 1) Not teaching religion but the child;
    - 2) The sacredness of personality;
    - 3) The realization of personality





as a matter of growth;

- 4) The necessity for the immortality of finite personalities.

E. The theory of the conservation of values drives one into a personalistic philosophy:

- 1) Christianity especially has a personalistic background;
- 2) Religious education becomes vital and living.

4. The conclusion of the paper:

A. There are religious values to be conserved:

- 1) These values are unique, as contrasted with Höffding's empirical values;
- 2) The assurance of personal immortality must be given.

B. These religious values must gain objectivity through their increase in the development of personalities:

- 1) It is only through the increase of value that progress is made; Höffding fails to put adequate





emphasis upon this point;

- 2) It is the increase of value which gives to religious education its right to be.

C. Religion is the systematization of all the values into an organic whole of life:

- 1) The view of the "whole of life" is incompatible with Höffding's positivistic theory;

- a) A narrower view would not be religious;

- b) Höffding refutes his own theory of value in the denial of personalism.

- 2) Reality-Value must be Personal:

- a) Values are realized only through personalities;

- b) Cooperation for the working out of the world purpose involves Will on the Divine side as well as on the human.





Höffding's Theory of Religious  
Value and its Relation to Education.

"There shall never be one lost good."

Browning, in Abt Vogler

The purpose of this paper is to study the meaning of religion and the nature of religious values in the human life. In order to expand this thought we shall attempt: 1. to expound and criticize Höffding's theory of the conservation of religious values, as found in his Philosophy of Religion; 2. to show the significance of emphasizing the increase of these values; 3. to show the relation of these propositions to religious education.

What is Höffding's theory of religious values? His statement is clear and concise: "The conservation of value is the characteristic axiom of religion."<sup>1</sup> That is, religion has at its heart the ideal of the conservation of values. Two terms need defining: the whole expression, "conservation of value", and the

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<sup>1</sup> Höffding. Phil. of Rel. 1st. Ed. p. 10.





term "value" itself. Höffding says, "I use the expression 'conservation of value' in analogy with the expression 'conservation of energy', so that the Axiom asserts the continuous conservation of value throughout all transformations."<sup>1</sup> We shall look further into this analogy with science later in the paper. "Value denotes the property possessed by a thing either of conferring immediate satisfaction or serving as a means to procuring it,"<sup>2</sup> This is by no means a unique definition of the term "value", and would probably be generally accepted. It brings out the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values. Some values are worthwhile because of what is inherent in them, while others are valuable in that they lead to values which are ends in themselves. However, it must be noted that this definition is hedonistically onesided, in that the stress is laid upon the satisfaction of feeling involved, at the same time ignoring, or apparently

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 12.





ignoring, the formalistic element of the relation of the individual value to the whole system of values. It is true that there is nothing in Höffding's thought to lead one to think that he would reject this element; in either case it would not influence his axiom only in so far as it would bring to importance a different set of values. The goal of life is not mere satisfaction: values contribute strength to life as well. Our idea of value is inextricably bound up in our idea of the aim and motive of life. Everett in his Moral Values calls the idea of value the appreciation of good,<sup>1</sup> and the goods of life are dependent upon the ideal of what life ought to be.

In this paper the following outline will be followed: 1. The relation of the axiom of the conservation of values to physical science; 2. the relation of the axiom to experience; 3. the psychological discussion of the axiom; 4. the historical discussion of the axiom; 5. the

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<sup>1</sup> Everett, W.G. Moral Values. p. 7.





axiom treated epistemologically; 6. the bearing of metaphysics on the axiom; 7. the ethical working out of the axiom. It will be noticed that this is not the same outline that Höffding uses. He treats the general subject of the Philosophy of Religion under three main heads: the epistemological, the psychological and the ethical. Under the second, or the psychological point, the axiom of the conservation of value is taken up in detail showing its relation to experience, to psychology and history, and to philosophy. It is easily seen why Höffding uses this manner of procedure. He is interested first in the nature of reality, second in an understanding of the axiom in its different aspects, and third in the working out of the principle in the moral life. It will be more to the point in this paper, however, to make clear in our minds the meaning of the conservation of value, and then to see how this axiom fits in with the conception of reality as a whole. It is to be hoped that an understanding of the axiom will be gained from the study





of these seven viewpoints which may enable us to estimate the validity and the weaknesses of the principle which Höffding proposes in relation to the specific problem at hand of religious education.

As has been mentioned earlier, the doctrine of the conservation of value is analogous with the conservation of energy in physical science. To say that as energy is conserved in the physical world, so is value conserved in the religious world, is apparently to put the whole treatment on a scientific plane. There is no doubt that Höffding's procedure has its advantages. At the same time, there is a danger that the terms value and energy will be confused or rather blended so that any difference between the two will be obscured. Höffding sees this danger and points out that energy might conceivably persist without value, but that value, on the other hand is dependent for its preservation upon energy.<sup>1</sup> That is, the conservation of energy is not equivalent to saying that value is con-

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<sup>1</sup> Höffding. Phil. of Rel. p.11.





served, since not all energy is valuable. There is, however, a very real way in which the two axioms are analogous. Energy is conserved, but not by any means in the same form through all the years: the energy loosed from the burning log is transformed into heat waves. In the case of the conservation of religious values, the disappearance of value in a certain form may be necessary in order that it may be realized in a higher form of in a more efficient way. Therefore, Höffding's axiom does not assert that a certain definite value will remain valuable through the ages, but rather that there will be the "continuous conservation of value throughout all transformations".<sup>1</sup>

Höffding notes the distinction between potential and actual value, as analogous to the same distinction made by the physicists concerning energy, but this distinction does not seem to be of any importance in the working out of his thesis. The whole question as to whether the conservation of value is sufficient as a

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p.11.





religious axiom or not, will be brought up later in the critical study of Höffding's work. It is enough to say here that should it be decided that the increase of value is a necessary part of a religious axiom of value the analogy between physical energy and spiritual value would at that point break down.

In the second place we discover a definite relation of the axiom of the conservation of value to experience. In order to have assurance that the axiom has validity, we must see whether it fits in with our experience or not. — Is there anything in our religious experiences which would contradict such an axiom? Or on the other hand, do we find things in experience which would lead us to put more faith in it? There are two points which Höffding makes, which seem to be relevant here:

1. "Religion presupposes that men have discovered by experience that there is something valuable."<sup>1</sup> The very fact that men have found

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 217.





something which satisfies their need in the religious life, is proof that they believe that there is something real in experience which is of value. Could the most primitive religious devotee be induced to perform rites before his wooden god, if he did not believe that value was either attached to the ceremony, or inherent in the god.

2. "Religion also presupposes the special experience that the fate of values is at stake in the battle of experience."<sup>1</sup> This presupposition does not seem to be so evident as the first, but I believe that it is a correct diagnosis of the religious experience. The religious man throws the strength of his convictions on the side of that which seems to him to be of value and by this act asserts that there is a conflict going on. The Zoroastrian religion is the most telling example of this phase of religious experience. Now the question arises, does experience tend to show us that values are being conserved? Höfding is frank to state that at first sight this is not so,

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 219.





but he goes on to say that "in order completely to establish and verify the axiom of the conservation of value it would be necessary to show that nothing in the course of the world is merely a means or a possibility, still less a hindrance, but that on the contrary that which possesses mediate worth has always immediate value also, and that all hindrances are also means."<sup>1</sup> Whether this world view is possible or not depends upon the philosophical conception held, and we shall see whether Höffding's philosophy makes such a presupposition legitimate. If the axiom is an established axiom, then it will be necessary for Höffding to show that such a view of the experience of life as a means to a great end is tenable.

Closely connected with this study of experience and its relation to the conservation of religious values, is the testimony which the psychological study of the philosophy of religion may be able to give. The question

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 223.





arises, does the psychological analysis of the religious consciousness find that faith in the conservation of values is the basis of the experience? Höffding takes up the problem from the standpoint of religious experience and religious faith. He comes to the conclusion after his study that the religious consciousness is unique in that it is "an experience of God", but he goes on to say that such an experience is so called "in so far as it leads to a faith in the preservation of value in spite of all things and throughout all things." <sup>1</sup> We experience reality; we experience value; and, psychologically speaking, the relation which we make between these two facts of experience is the religious consciousness. "He who will experience God must exercise himself in discerning the kernel of value beneath the hard husk of reality." <sup>2</sup> This is not the time to ask whether the "peculiar characteristics" of religion are found in the relation between value and reality", but we

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 134.





may say that if this is a correct psychological analysis of the experience, there is established one more point in favor of the axiom of the conservation of value being the fundamental hypothesis of religion.<sup>1</sup> As in our personal religious experiences we may find a faithfulness which makes a direct relationship between value and reality,<sup>2</sup> so we may assume that there is in existence a something which is analogous to this faithfulness which is expressed in the doctrine of the conservation of value. "Thus there is an inner connection between religious faith on the one hand, and the assumption of the conservation of value on the other."<sup>3</sup>

What have the historical religions to

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<sup>1</sup> "Our psychological investigation of the philosophy of religion tends to confirm our hypothesis that faith in the conservation of value constitutes the essence of religion." Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 243.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 243.





add to the discussion? Where have they placed the emphasis? In the main, as Höffding points out, there are two types of historical religions:

1. One type believes that the highest values are always present. No doubt there are difficulties involved in this conception: for instance, there is the opposition between time and eternity. Did the values become the highest in time, and if so, does eternity change their value? Moreover, not all the values are eternally saved; sometimes that which we consider as most valuable is doomed to pass away, and if value is statically and eternally present in definite forms, then a contradiction is involved.

2. The second type of historical religion believes that the highest values are gained only through struggle and strife. Values are in a certain sense in the process of evolution, they develop in as far as they are realized in the lives of finite beings. Difficulties are not eliminated by the adoption of this system. The dogma of eternal





punishment lifts its head. If eternal punishment is meted out to an individual, no amount of struggle will develop values, but will only be the negation of values. Indeed, the problem becomes acute when it is asserted, as in Höffding's philosophy, that values may be realized through personalities alone. The dogma of creation also must be modified if it is to be thinkable in the same system in which values are not created in their full capacity, but come to their full fruition by the process of evolution. It is interesting to note that both types of religion take values into account and that the problems arising in both systems become apparent as the system as a whole fails to make room for the conservation of these values. "To sum up", as Höffding says, "the result, up to this point, of our inquiry into the two leading forms of religion is that in both there is a distinct tendency to assert the conservation of value, which tendency comes out more especially in their efforts to rebut objections which are based on an apparent shrinkage of values."<sup>1</sup> It is seen,

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 241.





therefore, that there is no one historical religion which fully comprehends the full meaning of the religious axiom: formal religion is too often narrowly disposed when it comes to the incorporation of new bodies of material into its old-time ritual and dogmas. Thus it happens that the inner discrepancies which are found in all types of historical religions are there because of self-imposed limitations.<sup>1</sup>

Epistemologically, an understanding

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1 "We must remember that religion is inclined to proceed from far too narrow a concept of value, or from the assumption that the content of values has been discovered once and for all, so that all we have to do is to preserve the same or to live in the conviction that it will be preserved. But so long as new experiences arise, so long new values may arise, although religion always offers a certain resistance to them, and can only gradually be induced to include them in the content which she believes will be preserved." Ibid., p. 242.





of being rests upon the necessary presupposition of the "principle of unity"<sup>1</sup> When we come to the realm of religion, however, do we find this "principle of unity" the guiding star of religious concepts? What we do find are two concepts, God and the World, which apparently are opposed one to the other. Both the philosophical and the religious consciousness is "confronted by the great problem as to the relation between unity and multiplicity."<sup>2</sup> Philosophy, however, goes on to assert that there is a unity which underlies the manifold, or rather, which expresses itself in the many; religion fails to make that step, and the doctrines of the opposition between God and the World have been the result. Höffding shows that the concept World is merely a half truth, the conclusions of which have never been thought through.<sup>3</sup> Religion finds it well nigh impos-

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> "I am not able to see that theology by its doctrine of 'God' and 'World' can help us





sible to come to a knowledge of the world, or the manifold, at the same time in which it holds to the conception of a God who is not immanent in His world. As long as God is merely transcendent, the world must be apart from and other than Him. Theology has thus committed itself to an inevitable dualism and disunited concept. Wherein, then, lies the value in religion from the standpoint of knowledge? Religion does not attempt to give, and, in fact, cannot give, scientific explanations of reality. It is the duty of religion, on the other hand, to hold up great concepts or symbols of faith which should relate man's spiritual life to experience as a whole. In relating this thought to the doctrine of the conservation of values, Höffding says: "The way for this hypothesis was already indirectly

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over this fundamental difficulty, which epistemologically affords an indirect proof that we have arrived at a limiting concept." Ibid., p. 65.





prepared in the epistemological section of this work, where it was pointed out that the meaning of religion could not be to afford a scientific explanation of existence. If religious ideas are to possess any value, it must be because they serve to give figurative form and expression to other sides of the soul's life than those which are served by intellectual ideas."<sup>1</sup> From a strictly epistemological standpoint we know religious reality as symbols and expressions of the spiritual life of man. It is religion, therefore, which brings about a harmony between what is and what ought to be.<sup>2</sup>

This brings us directly to the question of the relation of metaphysics to the axiom of the conservation of value. There are two main points which seem important in Höffding's treatment of the philosophical side of the question.

1. It is not only true that the given

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 243.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 244.





axiom may be reconcilable with scientific inquiry but it is also true that it may even be deduced from science. This eliminates any controversy between philosophy and science. How is this true? "Science has worked up to the view that all changes in existence are transformations from one form of life to another, transformations which take place according to definite quantitative relations. This is the direction in which scientific inquiry advances; it recognizes with increasing facility the new to be a form of the old; the new is deduced from the old; and for every new phenomenon a preceding one is pointed out to which it corresponds as effect to cause."<sup>1</sup> Is this not analogous to the philosophical analysis of the doctrine of the conservation of values?

2. In the second place, the discord in the world of experience which was found to be so difficult for epistemology, proves to be of no philosophical difficulty in the assertion of the conservation or maintenance of value. This is true, as Höffding conceives

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 244.





it, for the following reasons: 1. In comparison with the vast whole of existence our experience is strictly limited. What seems true to us in our brief minute of life is only a fragment of the whole life of the universe. Who can tell what relation this small fragment may have to the whole seamless robe of value, or Reality? 2. "Life is always renewing itself. Every year has its May, every generation its youth. Hence new dispositions are always springing up, and there are no signs of the world's getting old. A new chapter in the history of existence is for ever opening, for which the series of earlier experiences on which we based our judgments on the value of reality is only a prologue: the whole of the previous drama is only the prologue of a greater drama to come. Existence is not only immeasurable, it is also inexhaustible."<sup>1</sup> This is one of the most beautiful passages in Höffding's Philosophy of Religion. It is optimistic, but it is not false optimism, and the hope which it inspires is the hope of eter-

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 271.





nal renewing of Life in the sense of the conservation of abiding values. 3. "The fact that the discord is felt is also itself a proof that existence contains value."<sup>1</sup> As long as we are in the stragglings mood, trying to realize values, we may be sure that just in so far existence must contain values. If only one person remained to believe that there was a value in life, even so would value be present.

The final evidence which we may bring to bear upon the validity of the conservation of value as the most basic religious axiom is from the field of ethics. Is religion dependent upon ethics, or vice versa? Without doubt, as Höffding points out, "values must be discovered and produced in the world of experience before they can be conceived or assumed to exist in a higher world."<sup>2</sup> Moreover, religion is justified only when it fosters the discovery and production of values in the world of experience<sup>3</sup>. These two considerations would

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 272.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 330.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 331.





point to the belief that religion is prior to ethics. "Ethical feeling develops in the struggle for life," and the struggle for life is dependent upon the belief that there are values in life which it is worth while to preserve. In this way the connection which ethics bears to the axiom of the conservation of value is very apparent. In fact, "religion will gain in positive value if it can be seen to be a condition which enables us to produce and discover values within the world of experience."<sup>1</sup> Without ethics, or the actual realization of values, the axiom itself would mean nothing, except in a purely abstract sense.<sup>2</sup>

After this study of the seven aspects in which the axiom of the conservation of value may be viewed, it may be concluded that such a view of religion is conceivable

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 331.

<sup>2</sup> There is something noble in the ethical command: "Make life, the life thou knowest, as valuable as possible." Ibid., p. 381. Too often religion fails to take note of life as it is.





from many points of view in experience. The axiom is analogous with the theory of the conservation of energy in physics; it is attested to be valid by experience in the facts of life; it is psychologically possible, and its shadow, at least, is evident in historical religions. Epistemology shows that religion is concerned with the realm of values; metaphysics asserts the validity of the axiom in that it reinforces the philosophical unified world view; and ethics sees in it the practical working out of religious feeling in every day life. We must now consider the criticisms of Höffding's theory, examining them in the light of our study of the problem of religion.

The first criticism which should be made, points at the very axiom itself, and questions its right as the fundamental axiom of religion. Is the conservation of values the essential element in the religious consciousness? This question goes to the very heart of the theory, for if the axiom is not valid, Höffding's entire philosophy of religion is at stake. Let





us look at the matter more closely. What is religion? I would like to suggest as a working definition that it is the finite being's feeling of dependence upon a power outside and greater than himself, with whom he has the privilege of cooperating in the bringing to pass of a unified Divine Purpose. The question now is, is the conservation of value a valid summing up of this religious consciousness? If the Divine Power outside of the finite being is not necessarily considered to be Personal, it can be seen how this axiom expresses the essential element in religion, namely, the cooperation of the religious person in the realizing of the values which must be needful in the working out of the purpose of the Divine Power. At the same time, I can easily understand why it is that such an axiom should be criticized from the standpoint of one who believes that a Personal God is Reality. This point will come out more fully in the discussion of Höffding's idea of God. It is important to note what kind of values we are to live to conserve. It is difficult to discover just





what religious values are to be conserved.

In fact, I have found discussions of the religious values very inadequate and unilluminating. Höffding definitely states that the concept of value is empirical<sup>1</sup>, that is, found in experience. In another place he speaks of practical values<sup>2</sup> which "can be found or produced in the present life."<sup>3</sup> This would certainly lead us to think that the values which would make our life worth while are to be found in the everyday moral existence of the individual. It is true that the ethical or moral virtues are the ones in which Höffding seems to be the most interested. Just when we think that we are about to discover wherein religious value consists, we are referred back again to ethics.<sup>4</sup> Now it is perfectly true that re-

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 259.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 349.

<sup>3</sup> See also Ibid., p. 374. Another assertion of the same point.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 374. "The question as to what values are believed in, and how we are to know





ligion deals, or at least should deal, with life and all its present ethical problems, but we have no right to infer from this fact that the values which are sought to be realized are also of such an empirical nature. By no means, unless we admit that reality itself is merely empirical. Höfding's theory takes away any uniqueness from religious values. It is true that he says: "Religious and ethical motives need not stand in a relation of complete opposition to one another, for religious motives may include ethical within themselves."<sup>1</sup> In this statement he seems to say that there is a distinction, but the preceding sentence is this: "Religious faith, when it has become clear as to its own nature and has attained its zenith, assumes an independent human ethic, which has, as a matter of fact, developed his-

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that what has been discovered and produced is valuable, refers us back from religion to ethics."

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 329.





torically under the practical influence of the ethical feeling of men."<sup>1</sup> This would tend to show that when religious faith becomes properly civilized, it becomes human ethic, and he makes the unequivocal statement that "religion is in the last resort dependent on ethics for its criterion of value."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, in the last analysis, in Höffding's mind, the values which it is the whole of man's religious duty to conserve are the values which ethics stands for.<sup>3</sup> I believe that there are other and unique values, such as God-consciousness and

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 330.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 333.

<sup>3</sup> Note Galloway. Phil. of Rel. p. 21. "Höffding's Religionsphilosophie is a bold and in some ways a striking attempt to show that religion may be properly understood as a specific mode in which man relates himself to mundane experience and which is helpful to social development. The difficulty of course is that...faith would lack any sure and steadfast ground for the validity of its postulate."





worship and prayer, which it is the duty of religious beings to conserve.<sup>1</sup> It is sometimes asserted that because religion has to do with the whole life that religious value consists only in the harmonious union of all the other values. Religion involves the relating of each individual aspect of life to the whole of life, but is that all there is to religion? Religion is unique in its attitude toward Reality: there is involved in man's attitude to God a sense of awe and devotion, an attributing of Holiness<sup>2</sup> to the object of awe which cannot be reduced to any other value, such as ethical, aesthetic or intellectual. Take, for example, the experience of communion with God, fellowship with the Divine. It is early morning and the sun is rising out of the ocean. The sense experiences of sight and sound become lost in the deeper experience

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<sup>1</sup> Hocking says in his Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 478: "Religion is fruitful through worship."

<sup>2</sup> See R. Otto's new book, Das Heilige.





of the nearness of God, and a feeling of awe because of the nearness. Analyze the experience. It has aesthetic value: the splendor of the sunrise and the expanse of the sea; it has intellectual value: the belief in a Divine cause of all things. Does this exhaust the experience? The sense of awe, "das Heilige", - as Otto calls it, - has not been touched in the analysis. The core of the experience is something more than the aesthetic or the intellectual: it is distinctively religious. The autonomy of the religious values, then, does not imply a complete separation from the other values, nor is it mere belief in the existence of God, but it is a unique attitude toward Reality, including inner experiences of God, and a relation of each individual value to the whole realm of values. Religion sees the entire moral life in the light of the whole Divine Plan. In the last analysis, therefore, I should agree with Höffding that the conservation of values is a religious axiom of the greatest importance, even though I cannot agree with him in his conception of religion, nor





his idea of the nature of the values to be conserved.

Some of the reviewers of the Philosophy of Religion find much to criticize from the side of the subjectivity of the theory. Professor French, in the Philosophical Review writes: "The practical question for us is, which of the various kinds of value possible to us shall we seek most to realize? It is difficult to see how a belief in the conservation of values in general can help any."<sup>1</sup> Professor Bailey, who is very appreciative of the work as a whole nevertheless finds very great difficulty with the seemingly unavoidable subjectivism into which we are thrown by Höffding's theory: "It is difficult to get rid of the conclusion that from first to last the substance and form of religion have, on Professor Höffding's theory, no genuine objective basis or immovable ground at all."<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to answer these criticisms. If objectivity is maintained by Höffding to be inherent in value, the fact is indeed well hidden.

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<sup>1</sup> Philosophical Review. Vol. 2. p. 181.

<sup>2</sup> International Journal of Ethics. 17:377.

See also: Saturday Review. 103:687.

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Some of the reviewers of the *Philosophical*

of *Philosophical* that must be criticized for the

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What is the relation of the philosophical

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Criticisms of Höffding's conception of the religious concepts of God and Immortality come from many thinkers. Let us first consider the idea of God. It would certainly seem natural, in a system which placed so much emphasis upon value, and upon the value of personality in particular, that the ultimate reality, or the unity of the whole should be found in a Personality. Therefore, we seek to understand what Höffding means by the concept God, and we are surprised to find that it is really no more than a concept in his mind, a mere formulation of an axiom. "If we assume that value will be preserved, and if we call the principle of the conservation of value by the name of God, then it will be clear that this principle can nowhere be so immediately present and operative as in our strivings to find and produce values."<sup>1</sup> Here God is undeniably identified with the axiom of the conservation of value. Again: "Great religious personalities have called the object of their highest trust and love 'God', and we can comprehend this as we

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<sup>1</sup>Höffding. Phil. of Rel. p.384.





understand by 'God' the principle of the conservation of value in reality,"<sup>1</sup> I should like to ask the "great religious personalities" if they understood what love to God meant through the comprehension of the principle of the conservation of value. This seems to be false psychology, to say the least. In fact, since Höffding admits that love and trust enter into the religious experience, he must necessarily go on to say that the object of the love and trust is of a personal nature. We are merely following his lead in asserting this. Is it possible to love an axiom? Quoting Professor Beillie again, we find that he believes that "no doubt the last word in any interpretation (of God) must lie with personality: what one feels is that, for religion this seems both the first and the last word, and ought to be so considered in determining the nature of religious experience."<sup>2</sup> In fact, it seems to me that this disbelief in the personality of God is detrimental if not destructive to his whole

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>2</sup>Int. Jour. Eth. 17:380.





theory of the conservation of value. Personality is the only means through which values may be expressed.<sup>1</sup> If this is true, what would be the result if Reality itself had no means by which to express value? The Reviewer in the *Athenaeum* says: "Not that our author, good psychologist that he is, underrates the principle of personality. On the one hand he holds that 'scientific work is a work of personality', on the other, that it is 'personality which in the world of our experience invests all other things with value'. And yet with him the 'cosmical vital feeling' which expresses itself in religion seems wholly disinterested.... But is this strictly possible on his own principles?"<sup>2</sup> Galloway, who is more or less influenced by Höffding, does not follow him, however, in this conception of God, since he finds a personal God necessary to his theory of the value of Personality.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sorley. *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. p. 123.

<sup>2</sup> *Ath.* 1906. 2:569.

<sup>3</sup> Galloway. *Phil of Rel.* p. 504. "The truth of the religious experience itself is bound up with the





Höfdding finds himself in the same difficulty when he comes to his idea of Immortality. In his own words: "The eternal is in the present, in every valuable moment...To live eternal life in the midst of time, that is the true immortality, whether or not there is any other immortality."<sup>1</sup> Practically the same question arises here, as in the case of an impersonal God, for if there is no certainty that finite beings, the only bearers and realizers of values, have an eternal life, but that there is a possibility that they may

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conviction that God is personal for religion cannot be true if there is no guarantee that its essential aspirations are not futile."

<sup>1</sup>Höfdding. Phil. of Rel. p. 384. Incidentally it should be noted that Höfdding is here asserting that values are valuable whether they are conserved or not: a theory which takes away the significance of the conservation of the values, and asserts a somewhat Platonic conception of the Absoluteness of value, or even the Kantian "Ding an sich".





become naught, then where is the force in the assertion of the conservation of values?

Without the existence of personalities, the doctrine of value means nothing at all. Galloway has put the matter very concisely, "If value is to be conserved, then the personal beings who are the active centres and supports of values must also be conserved."<sup>1</sup> I would not wish to be thought to deny the truth of the fact that eternal life is present in time in a very real sense, but I do mean to say that not to assert immortality in eternity tends to break down the distinction between end and means, and between religion and ethics, and fails to give any earnest of a time transcending conservation of values.<sup>2</sup>

There are three criticisms which Sorley makes upon Höffding's philosophy of religion that

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<sup>1</sup>Galloway. *Idea of Immortality*. p. 175.

See also Sorley. *Moral Values*.. p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Galloway in his *Philosophy of Rel.* p. 574 says: "There is something contradictory in the thought that the self, whose spiritual vocation transcends the world should itself be involved in the doom of all earthly things."





it will be well to look into. In Sorley's recent book, Moral Values and the Idea of God, from which I have quoted earlier in the paper, there is an entire chapter devoted to a treatment of the Conservation of Value, and it is in this chapter that he makes his criticisms of Höffding. 1. In the first place, Sorley considers that Höffding's theory is too narrow; that the "problems involved are wider and more complicated than the simple phrase 'conservation of value' suggests. We have, therefore, to deal not with one thing only but with four things: the discovery, the production, the conservation, and the increase of values."<sup>1</sup> Religion is interested not only in the conservation of value, faith in which "is a matter of life or death for the religious consciousness,"<sup>2</sup> but it is also interested in the production of value, and the increase of more values. I do not feel that Höffding would disagree with a word that Sorley is trying to say; in fact, in the introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, he notes

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<sup>1</sup>Sorley. Moral Values.. p. 160.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 159.





these aspects of the problem himself. "Where immediate value is given we seek to preserve it; where not given, to produce it."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, "an increase of value in no way conflicts with the conservation of energy."<sup>2</sup> Sorley does not make his point here, in that Höffding does take the larger meaning of the axiom into account.

2. However, Sorley goes on to point out that Höffding has made a serious mistake in putting the emphasis of his doctrine upon the conservation of value rather than upon the increase. At this point in the argument Sorley has put his finger upon vulnerable spot in Höffding's thesis. "It is characteristic of the moral, and also of the religious, consciousness to be impressed by the discrepancy between ideal and fact." What does this lead to? "Moral practice has to be alert and active in order to maintain its ground.. lest values once realized in life should afterwards be lost. But it is not restricted to the mere conservation of value....The values which

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<sup>1</sup>Höffding. Phil. of Rel. p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 11.





have been realized must not be let go; but their range must be extended over fresh fields of experience, and new means must be sought for enlarging the realm of worth."<sup>1</sup> It seems strange that Höffding, with his emphasis upon the ethical life, failed to stress the increase of values as the fundamental religious axiom, in that it expresses more fully and adequately the activity of the moral life. Was Höffding right? The most peculiar thing in Höffding's attitude in the matter is the emphasis which he himself places upon the increase of value in the first chapter of his book. "It may be contended that the mere conservation of value is insufficient, and, indeed, that it involves a contradiction, for, since repetition stales, value can only really be preserved by increase; while, on the other hand, change can only itself be of value if it lead to an increase."<sup>2</sup> He goes on to show that an increase of value does not in any way contradict the conservation; he

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<sup>1</sup>Sorley. Moral Values. p. 177.

<sup>2</sup>Höffding. Phil. of Rel. p. 11.





fails to show that increase is the fulfilment of conservation. "For simplicity's sake" he limits his study to the mere conservation of value, and he intends to show us that the religious consciousness has also limited itself in the same way.

Is he entirely true to his own convictions as to the importance of the axiom of the increase of value? "What can possibly be the good, not merely for us, but also for the good itself, of realizing what is realized already? Leibnitz did well to say, 'Nisi beatitudo in progressu consisteret, stuperent beati.'<sup>1</sup> It is all right to have faith in the conservation of values, but coupled with this must be the desire to increase these values in our own lives, making actual the potential capacities within us. Surely, as Höffding says "we ought not to forget that this does follow."<sup>2</sup> This is my own opinion on the matter: I believe that the increase of values is an important, if not the all important consideration in the value of experience in religion,

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted from a review of the Philosophy of Religion in the Athenaeum 1906. 1:519.

<sup>2</sup>Höffding. Phil. of Rel. p.11.





in that it is the foundation of progress and the vitalizing of religious ideals.<sup>1</sup>

3. Closely connected with Sorley's criticism concerning the increase of values, lies the third point of which I mean to speak. He feels that the doctrine of the conservation of values is an axiom which "is better adapted to express the mystical side of religion than that religious attitude which arises out of and consecrates practical morality."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the axiom of the increase of values expresses to a degree the practical life of religion. First, I would like to say that I do not feel that Sorley is entirely fair to the side of the mystics. Mysticism does not necessarily mean the negation of this world, nor the non-realization of

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<sup>1</sup>Sorley in his Moral Values makes this significant statement, p.178: "The demand which the religious consciousness makes always includes the moral demand for the increase of value: and it is of every increased value, and finally of values as fully perfected, that it postulates the conservation"

<sup>2</sup>Sorley. Moral Values. p.179.





ethical values, so that the practical and the mystical man may be interested in the increase of values and the progress of mankind. In the second place, I feel that Höfdding's treatment of religion by no means leans to the extreme mystical side of religion; on the contrary, we saw how very closely he was tied to the very practically ethical, and this-worldly application of the axiom of the conservation of values in the individual lives of men in time. The important thought to be gained from the discussion seems to me to be that religion is a matter of expression, that thought and action are both necessary to the well rounded life of the religious man.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the rather convincing criticisms which I have attempted to examine, there is, no doubt, a wealth of valuable material left in the theory of the conservation of values, and, in some cases, we hope, a deeper insight into the nature of religious value. It will be our

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<sup>1</sup>The following quotation from Perry, Present Conflicts of Ideals, p.345, is in point: "Life is not so much an advance toward a goal already set as it is an achievement of new goals."





next step to show how these positive implications of the axiom of the conservation and the increase of values are related to the general problems of religious education.

It might be a legitimate question to ask why the problems of religious education should be considered at all in such a paper. Why should Höffding's theory of the conservation of value have bearing in any way upon the problems which the churches are facing in the matter of religious education? The connection between the two is very real indeed: when the religious leaders are emphasizing as never before the need for religious instruction; when the means of "bringing up a child in the way he should go" is being recognized as a natural, gradual process of growth through education; when these facts are so, then it becomes a vital question as to the principle which is to underlie the education which is to be given. Every theory of education has its philosophy back of it. Is the program of religious education of today to be backed by an empirical philosophy without the guiding light of ideals, or by a ~~living~~ philosophy which does not fear to





hold up great ideals by which men may live. It rests with the philosopher-teacher to lay the groundwork of the plans. Pringle-Pattison says: "The presence of the ideal in human experience is as much a fact as any other,"<sup>1</sup> and moreover, "the presence of the ideal is the reality of God within us."<sup>2</sup>

The most fundamental positive implication which we have gained from the study of Höfding, is a belief that at the heart of religion is value for the conservation of which one would be willing to die. If we come right down to the point of the matter, we must say that it is because religion is of value that it is religion at all. Can we imagine loyalty to a valueless religion, at any rate after we have discovered that such a religion has no value? I believe that <sup>it</sup> is the chief function of religious education to conserve those values which lie at the heart of religion, and instil loyalty to them <sup>and</sup> to their increase. It becomes, therefore, a very practical question for religion to ask, what the values

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<sup>1</sup>Pringle-Pattison. *Idea of God*. p.244.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 246.





are which it is its duty to conserve. We have found earlier in the discussion that Höffding placed the emphasis upon the empirical ethical values, making them in his mind identical with the religious values. We also tried to make clear that these values were not the whole of the religious life of values, even though they do constitute a part of it. There is a significant article by Coe in the Journal of Philosophy for 1908, which asserts the uniqueness of the religious values: the religious values are spiritual, eternal, real and coherent, while others are material, temporal, phenomenal, and diversified.<sup>1</sup> Whereas Höffding put value at the basis of his philosophy of religion, did he put unique value there, or did he attempt to spiritualize moral value? Now, it is true, as Coe asserts,<sup>2</sup> any value may be a religious value, but only as it takes on a certain universality which links it up with the organic whole of life. This "complete realization of the unitary whole of values" is what Höffding means

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<sup>1</sup>Coe. Religious Value. Jour. Phil. Vol 15, # 10, p. 254.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 256.





by the conservation of value', but Coe fails to see how "the notion of a possible conservation of value otherwise than in the conservation of personalities really represents the religious motive."<sup>1</sup> The inevitable conclusion of a value theory is personal immortality. Höffding's own theory necessarily drives him into a doctrine which he nevertheless declines to adopt. There are, then, unique religious values which it is the function of the religious man to conserve. The chief of these values is what I shall call God-consciousness, which shall include the consciousness of cooperation of the finite individual with the Infinite Personality, in the carrying out of His purpose. It is the real function of religious education to impart this value to each individual as soon as he is able to grasp the significance of it. Too much religious education in the Church Schools in the past and even in the present has dealt only with external facts rather than with inner feelings. I am by no means denying the necessity of knowing the map of Palestine and the Missionary Journeys of Saint Paul, for

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 255.





instance, but I am merely asserting that another step must be taken to link up these empirical values with the vitalizing power of personality. It is excellent for the individual to become acquainted with the great value of truth, even in an abstract sense; it is more excellent to have the individual act in an ethically truthful sense; but, unless we link up this value of truth with reality and with his own inner feeling of God, then true religious education has not been given.<sup>1</sup> Religious values, therefore, must be conserved if religion is to have any unique meaning, and it is the part of religious education to make vital these values in individual lives.

In the second place, religious faith consists not only in the conservation of values, but also in a striving to increase the values. Here we are going one step further than Höffding in asserting the principle which he ignored after having admitted its importance. This principle has great significance for religious education. There is a danger that, if all the emphasis is

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<sup>1</sup>Coe, Religious Value. Jour. Phil. Vol.5."10,p.256.

"Ethical value and religious value are of the





placed upon the inner feeling and God-consciousness of religious experience, the result will be too subjective. It is therefore important for the educator to stress the necessity of realizing each value to its fullest extent, which is to infinity. In other words, there must be a growth, not only subjectively, but objectively.<sup>1</sup> Here it is that we come back again to ethical values and the necessity for their realization. We have arrived at them, however, from the religious side, and not from the purely ethical.<sup>2</sup>

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same kind, but one climbs only part way up the ladder which the other essays to mount to the very top."

<sup>1</sup>Perry, in the Present Conflict of Ideals has a theory of activity: "The value of life it is said lies not in what these functions may result in, not in any evil in which they may come to rest, but in their exercise." p. 336.

<sup>2</sup>It is interesting to note that Höffding speaks of religion as faith in the conservation of value while ethics reaches out to the discovery and production of value. (p. 374). This quotation by itself seems to carry the thought expressed above.





It is important that the value of truth should not only be conserved, but that it should be increased, in concrete acts of truth telling. We are told from a psychological standpoint that every impulse to realize value, without the concomitant realization of the value is worse than useless. It would seem true that the emphasis, psychologically at least, is wrong according to Höfding's theory. We must admit that faith in the conservation of value leaves room for, and indeed gives prominence to, a passive religious life, while a challenge to increase values is an <sup>9</sup>aggressive and active form which necessarily finds its strength and its ideal in the faith that value will be conserved: not only the value that now is, but also the value that will be because of my activity in bringing values to pass. Münsterberg, in his Eternal Values, seems to add a new thought to this problem of the place of morality in the life of the self: "This identity between the will to that action which we really will as action and the final action itself is the value of morality. Not the action is valuable but the personality which in the performed deed





realized its will to action and by the own willed self."<sup>1</sup> Action in and for itself does not represent the religious life; only in as far as it is the expression of the conscious willing of a self, is it of religious value. At the same time, not all the stress can be placed upon the meditative aspect of religion. We must remember with Hocking that "religion has no right apart from its descent into the world of effort."<sup>2</sup> The religious leader will recognize the fact that the mere bringing of a child into the "fold of the church" is <sup>not</sup> all there is to the responsibility which he should feel; such an act may conserve religious value, but this act of alliance with an organization must lead to definite action and growth if it becomes in any sense vital either to the individual or to the organization. The parable of the talents still holds true; unused values grow stale and tend to stagnate.

Closely allied with the discussion of the increase of values is the understanding of

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<sup>1</sup>Münsterberg. Ethical Values. p. 338.

<sup>2</sup>Hocking. Meaning of God in Human Experience.





the sense in which Höffding means that values are conserved. "The axiom of the conservation of value can often only be maintained by means of a change of values or by their realization in a fresh empirical content."<sup>1</sup> It might be maintained that the theory of the increase of values is here present in the meaning which is given to the conservation of values theory. I do not feel that this is true, in that mere change does not inevitably imply an increase. Höffding places much emphasis upon this point, and rightly so. "Faith in the conservation of value, therefore, can only maintain itself on the assumption that an uninterrupted spiritual work is going on in which the grain is distinguished from the chaff, not merely as long as existence produces nothing but odd and familiar fruits, but also when it brings forth new fruits. It may happen that what was originally regarded as chaff may afterwards be recognized to be grain and vice versa."<sup>2</sup> This conception of the changing appearance of value is of great significance when applied to the methods of

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<sup>1</sup>Höffding Phil of Rel. p. 249.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 249.





the religious educator. Are those who are dealing with the children of today bound to instil in their minds a theology of a century or more ago? Is there no advance in religious thought? Must theology be considered a static thing, which, if in the slightest degree modified, becomes of no intrinsic value? There is a reason why the young men and women of today fail to see in religion any value for their everyday lives, or any assurance of truth in their inner natures. It is no wonder that those who have come upon what is true in their scientific discoveries, and their intellectual research are at a loss when told that such truth is irreligious and even destructive of all religious values. For example, there is value in light of an artificial kind. Ages ago men discovered that the burning of oil would give such value, and oil lamps served a great purpose in giving light to dark places. Later, men discovered electricity, and a new artificial light was made possible. Shall we hold to the old oil lamps, thinking that electricity eliminates the value in the light itself? A conservative theologian, if he treats this value as he treats his





religious values, would answer yes, and logically should be forever going about with a little oil lamp. Religion, especially the Christian religion, is dynamic, and not static.<sup>1</sup> Höffding says:

"The power which worked in childish fashion in myth and legend will now having become a man, do the work of a man. This is the great hope of him whose faith is in the conservation of value, and who finds in religious phenomena values which must be preserved under new forms, when those forms under which they have hitherto usually appeared vanish away. Faith in the conservation of value rests on the conviction that in spite of the division of labour within the spiritual sphere the real values which were possessed by the spiritual life before the division of labour took place will never be lost."<sup>2</sup> If ever religious

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<sup>1</sup>Pringle-Pattison in his Idea of God writes: "Each time that the earthly body of a belief is laid in the dust, it receives a more glorious spiritual body, in which it continues its function as of old in the heart of man." p. 82.

<sup>2</sup>Höffding. Phil. of Rel. p. 209.





education needed this lesson it needs it to a greater degree today. The form in which God-consciousness is revealed to the hearts of men may change, but it is well to remember that the value of revelation is unchanged. Conservatism fails to understand the meaning of its doctrine of a Living God, for anything living is subject to change. Religious education should have as its keynote, the conception of growth and change. Hocking says that "all loss of value in the world is at the same time a loss of religious insight",<sup>1</sup> and we might add that religious insight is dependent not upon dogma and theology but upon life, and life abundant.

The next positive implication which we arrive at in our study is that values are possible only as they find realization in personalities."<sup>2</sup> We have seen that Höffding does not fail to make this point clear. "A personal being must never be treated as a mere means, but is always and first

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<sup>1</sup>Hocking. Meaning of God in Human Experience. p.434.

<sup>2</sup>Note Pringle-Pattison, in Idea of God, p.200:

"All values depend on feeling, on some form of consciousness or living experience."





of all to be regarded as an end. The ground for this is that in our experience personal beings appear in existence as centres of value, by which I mean, as the living central points in which value can be felt and acknowledged. It is personality which in the world of our experience invests all other things with value."<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note that one of the sayings of wisdom of the Hindus, taken from the Maha-Bharata, runs like this: "Never is lost or wasted the goodness of the good." It is not "goodness" which is eternal, but the "goodness of the good."<sup>2</sup> The necessary corollary of this is found in personal immortality. As Galloway remarks: "There is something contradictory in

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<sup>1</sup>Höffding. Phil. of Rel. p. 279. Note especially Kant. Note also Sorley, Moral Values, p. 123, "It is to persons, and not to mere things that the moral predicate can apply." Also T.H.Green: "All..values are relative to values for, of, or in a person."

<sup>2</sup>Note the criticism on the logical outcome of Höffding's theory of immortality in the footnote on p. 33 of the present paper.





the thought that the self, whose spiritual vocation transcends the world should itself be involved in the doom of all earthly things."<sup>1</sup>

These considerations also have a definite bearing upon the problem of religious education.

Any education must centre around the individual, and religious education above any other. There are four main points which might be made: 1. We are not teaching religion, but the individual. Let the emphasis be upon the bearer of value, since absolute value without means of expression is meaningless. This will save our education from becoming pedantic, impersonal or positivistic. 2. Personality is sacred. Other's rights, feelings, aspirations, and beliefs must not be ruthlessly ignored. A system of education which recognizes that every being has a place in the purpose of God, will stress such ideals as altruism, sympathy, tolerance and love. 3. Personality is a matter of growth and not a something which is achieved at one moment. Therefore, there

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<sup>1</sup>Galloway. Phil. of Rel. p.574. Quoted earlier in this paper in footnote #2 on p. 34.





will be change, there will be life, there will be perseverance and patience through the slow but steady process of development.<sup>1</sup> 4. Personality is immortal. In this belief we have the assurance that struggle and strife are not for nothing. Those values which become real in the lives of others because we have implanted therein the great ideals of our faith, will reach their fruition in eternity if not in time, and will become forthwith "eternal verities".

The last point which shall be brought out, and which seems to bear close relation to religious education is one which Höffding drives us into but fails to accept himself. A philosophy of values is primarily a philosophy of religion; in the same way a philosophy of values rests upon the assumption, if it be merely an assumption, that there are personalities. It becomes necessarily true, therefore, that a philosophy of re-

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<sup>1</sup>"Man is not moulded mechanically by things and men, but...by the reaction of an inner principle upon extraneous influences, by which process his nature is gradually developed." Paulsen in his System of Ethics, p. 459.





ligious values drives one to the conclusion that Reality is Personal.<sup>1</sup> Höffding's whole theory leads him to a personal interpretation of religion, and yet he falls short of making the logical conclusion into which he pushes himself. He admits that "personal life is the highest form of existence revealed to us in experience."<sup>2</sup> Moreover, he agrees that "a relation cannot be absolutely one-sided, and the religious consciousness itself would take exception at the idea of its being a matter of indifference to God whether creation existed or not."<sup>3</sup> If God is not indifferent, then He is ipso facto different, or Personal. Höffding is himself a positivist, but his logic drives others into personalism. Religious ed-

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<sup>1</sup>Galloway. Phil. of Rel. p.504. "The truth of the religious experience itself is bound up with the conviction that God is personal for religion cannot be true if there is no guarantee that its essential aspirations are not futile."

<sup>2</sup>Höffding. Phil. of Rel. p.86.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.83.





education needs a living, vital philosophy behind it. Christianity, especially, rests upon the belief in a personal God. At the very heart of this religion lies the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. This conception, to go one step further is possible only through the Divine Personality of Christ. An education which intends to bring out to its fullest the meaning of the personal relations which are possible between the Infinite and the finite must be backed by a personalistic philosophy. Hocking makes this significant statement: "Religion is fruitful through worship; and may we not say, it is the one fruitful thing in the world?"<sup>1</sup> Is worship possible without the belief in a personality to whom worship is due? Religious education with its opportunity for making the consciousness of a personal God vital in the lives of individuals, has no foundation upon which to stand, has neither value nor meaning, without the backing of a philosophy of religion which takes into account the possibility of cooperation between God and man for the working out

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<sup>1</sup>Hocking. Meaning of God....p.478.





of the Divine Purpose. "Harmony (between the moral and the natural orders) may be reached if it is allowable to assume purpose in the world and freedom in man. Nature can then be regarded as an appropriate medium for the realization of value by minds finite but free. The harmony is a relation which stands in need of realization and the purpose of realizing it requires consciousness in the ground of reality as a whole. This ground or principle of reality will therefore involve the will to goodness as well as intelligence and power; and this is what we mean by God."<sup>1</sup>

It will be well for us to make clear now to what conclusions we have come in our study of Höffding's theory and its relation to education. There are three main positive conclusions which should be maintained: 1. There are religious values to be conserved. In fact, there are unique religious values, without which there is no truly religious consciousness.<sup>2</sup> Höffding is to be criticized in that

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<sup>1</sup>Sorley. Moral Values. p.480,481.

<sup>2</sup>What I have called God-consciousness is an example, in fact the most fundamental, of the religious values.





he attributes no uniqueness to religious values, identifying them in most cases with the character values. The whole matter is treated from an empirical and positivistic standpoint. Moreover he fails to give the assurance of the conservation of the personality-value, which, according to his own theory is the only way through which all other value may be conserved. This failure to carry to its logical conclusion his own theory is conspicuous in his doctrine of immortality.

2. These religious values must gain objectivity through their increase by means of the development of personalities. In order that we may conserve a living and vital religion it is absolutely essential that we increase the religious values. The burning coal which is hidden safely away in order that it may be certainly preserved, never fails to die out, leaving the charred cinder with every bit of life and heat smothered out of it. The constant recurring of a strain of music, becomes mere monotony, without the least trace of æsthetic beauty. The water in the pool without a source and with no outlet becomes stag-





nant and even unhealthful. A value which is not eternally becoming of more value, ceases in the strict sense to be of value. As has already been pointed out in the paper, we do not feel that Höffding places enough emphasis upon this phase of philosophy of religion. It is especially significant in its relation to religious education. It is the necessity for the increase in values which gives to religious education its right to be. Religious education has the great privilege of making vital and real in the individual's life the unique religious values, and also the values of life inasmuch as they contribute value to the deeper meaning of life. It is this "making vital and real" which is for the increase of the values. The dogmas, doctrines, and rituals of the church would be enough to conserve religious values, but religious education is needed if these values are to be increased.

3. Religion is the systematization of all the values into an organic whole of life. Unless Höffding's axiom of the conservation of value takes into account this "large look" on life, it is too narrow to be taken as a religious





axiom.<sup>1</sup> It is my belief that such an interpretation of religion cannot be held together with positivism. Here it is that Höffding fails to take the consequences of his own theory. While pushing us over the brink into the sea of Personalism, he stands safely on sense-perception terra firma, fearful to take the logical step lest, perchance, he find himself unable to swim when he no longer <sup>can</sup> ~~could~~ touch the shore. In short, his positivism is incompatible with his theory of value. If the latter theory stands,<sup>2</sup> then the former falls. Every value has its

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<sup>1</sup>In Dewey's most recent book, Human Nature and Conduct, (1922), he speaks of "religion as a sense of the whole." (p.331). This is a most significant acknowledgment when coming from a man like Dewey. Note also Hocking, MGHE, p.415.

<sup>2</sup>Spaulding the neo-realist, in an article in the February (1922) issue of Scribners, states emphatically: "Values are efficient causes, forces, powers in our lives, albeit they are immaterial. In brief, it is by values that we live." (p.203). This is very characteristic of the trend of thought today.





relation to every other value and to the whole of the organic system of values.<sup>1</sup> Finite personalities, through whom alone values are realized, are related to other finite personalities and to the Infinite Being whom we call God. If this God has not Personality, how is value either resident in Him or attributed to Him? We must choose whether our religious education shall deal with nerves, valves, and axioms, or whether it shall hold up great ideals, realize intrinsic values,

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<sup>1</sup>Note Münsterberg, Eternal Values, p.354: "The life-value which secures the unity of the various worlds of values is religion."

<sup>2</sup>Hocking makes the following statement: (MGHE, 336)  
 "God has also a responsiveness of his own, and herein lies the immediate experience of the Personality of God." It is interesting to note that while Höffding and Hocking both make value the central point of religion, they diverge when it comes to the Personality of the Reality-Value, Hocking taking the logical step which Höffding fails to do.





and unite personalities through service to the Infinite Personality. The axiom of the conservation of value leads inevitably to the existence of a Personal God, with whom all finite personalities are cooperating to realize through lives of value the whole purpose of the Divine Will.





### Summary of the Thesis.

Höffding believes that the "conservation of value is the characteristic axiom of religion." This axiom finds an analogy in science in the theory of the conservation of energy; experience shows us that values are at stake; psychologically the relation between reality and value is the religious consciousness. The two predominant types of historical religion both deal with value; epistemology puts the emphasis of religion on symbolic value; metaphysics eliminates the difficulty of duality by means of the value experience of unity, while ethics is, in a real sense the realization of the values.

This theory is sometimes criticized in that it makes value the essential element in religion: it is thought that this is not true, but examination proves that value is essential to religion. In particular, Höffding's ideal of God and Immortality may be criticized, and justly, since his own theory of the conservation of value makes a personal God and belief in Immortality inevitable.





## II

Sorley criticizes Höffding for narrowness in his treatment of value, and for the stress laid on conservation rather than on the increase of value. The latter criticism has point and should be taken into account.

The following positive implications come out of this idea of the conservation and increase of religious values, and these implications have relation to religious education. There is value at the heart of religion which it is one's duty to conserve. Religious education finds its right to be inasmuch as it contributes to the increase of religious values. Values, and religious values especially, are conserved in essence, not necessarily statically. That is, the form under which the value appears may be changed from time to time; the essence alone remains. Personalities, and personalities alone, are the channels for the realization of values. In religious education this leads us to consider the truth that we are teaching the child and not religion, and to the realization of the sacredness of personality, es-





### III

pecially as a matter of growth. Another significant point is found in the necessary immortality of finite personalities resulting from such a theory. This theory which Höffding maintains drives one into a personalistic philosophy, and with Personalism as a philosophical background religious education becomes vital and living.

In conclusion we may say that there are religious values to be conserved: unique religious values realized through finite and immortal personalities. These values must gain objectivity through their increase in the lives of these personalities. It is only through increase that progress is made, and it is the duty of religious education to make this progress real. Religion itself is the systematization of all the values in an organic whole. Such a view of life is incompatible with a positivistic view which Höffding attempts to hold, but it leads directly to the conclusion that the Reality-Value must be personal in that cooperation in the working out of the world purpose involves Will on the Divine side as well as on the human.





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








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